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ABSTRACT 
Military civil support operations following Hurricane Katrina revealed a 
compelling need for improving the command and control arrangements between the 
National Guard, operating in Title 32 status subordinate to the governors, and U.S. 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) who controlled all of the assigned Title 10 active 
duty forces subordinate to the President.  This paper details the three mutually exclusive 
duty statuses of the National Guard, reviews the statutory, strategy and policy 
environment, and examines the joint military doctrine that covers civil support.  It 
describes the three potential command and control models with their strengths and 
weaknesses.  There is a detailed analysis of the USNORTHCOM’s Defense Support of 
Civil Authority concept plan with recommended enhancements.  The paper concludes 
that the command and control arrangement is situationally dependent and provides 
considerations for the commander.  There is no directive authority that compels the 
National Guard to work with U.S. Northern Command.  However, there are mutual 
benefits to working in partnership to create the coordination and communication model 
organization and procedures for future civil support operations that include the National 
Guard and USNORTHCOM.  The USNORTHCOM commander needs to build trust with 
the governors, and then get a full time National Guard brigadier general on his staff to 
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GUARD 
AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND IN CIVIL 
SUPPORT OPERATIONS FOLLOWING CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The National Guard predates the establishment of the United States and has its 
charter in the Constitution of the United States.  The National Guard has a long and 
distinguished record of service to the states and territories, and to the nation in federal 
status.  The National Guard performs with valor in wartime.  During peacetime, it has 
served its governors and citizens well in times of state crisis.1 
The United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has been in existence 
only since October 1, 2002.  Created in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States, its primary focus has been homeland defense.  Its secondary 
mission, defense support to civil authorities, also known as civil support, held a lower 
priority and emphasis.2 
USNORTHCOM’s homeland defense mission is the classic warfighting mission 
the Unified Command Plan assigns to all geographic combatant commanders.  In 
executing its homeland defense role, USNORTHCOM acts as the lead federal agency.  It 
will have operational control of all active duty military forces the Secretary of Defense 
places subordinate to the command for the defense mission.  Although the fact that its 
area of responsibility contains the United States complicates USNORTHCOM’s defense 
mission, its homeland defense roles and responsibilities are relatively clear, established 
and uncontroversial. 
This is not the case with its civil support role.  During most of the first three years 
of its existence, USNORTHCOM’s civil support mission appeared routine.  The 
command’s role was to command and control the active duty military forces that the 
Secretary of Defense assigned to USNORTHCOM for approved civil support mission 
assignments in support of another lead federal agency.  There was only modest active 
                                                 
1 The Army National Guard, “History of the Guard,” www.arng.army.mil/history/  (accessed January 
31, 2006). 
2 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington D.C: U.S. Department of Defense, 
June 2005), 1-5. 
2 
duty military participation in the domestic disasters that occurred.  The National Guard 
capably met the preponderance of the mission requirements while serving in state active 
duty status subordinate to the governors and without USNORTHCOM’s assistance.   
There were some transformational developments and advancements in the civil 
support mission sector.  In 2004 for example, the President placed National Guard 
general officers in Title 10 or federal status while they retained their Title 32 state status 
to conduct the civil support mission for the Democratic and Republican presidential 
conventions and the G8 Summit.  They had command authority over both the National 
Guardsmen serving the respective state governors and the Title 10 federal forces assigned 
to USNORTHCOM for the missions.  This architecture ensured unity of command over 
the National Guard forces and the supporting active duty military operating in the states.  
These were the unprecedented first applications of this command and control 
architecture.3 
It took a national catastrophe to expose significant gaps between the National 
Guard and USNORTHCOM in civil support operations.  That catastrophe was Hurricane 
Katrina in late August 2005.  Even though there were tens of thousands of National 
Guardsmen and active duty uniformed soldiers operating in the devastated area, there was 
no formal relationship between the National Guard and USNORTHCOM to provide 
coordination and synchronization of their efforts.  This problem adversely impacted the 
military’s response.4 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question this thesis addresses is what should be the relationship 
between the National Guard and USNORTHCOM for civil support operations following 
catastrophic events.  
C.  SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
Defining the relationship between the National Guard and USNORTHCOM for 
civil support operations is a contemporary and significant problem for the President, the 
Department of Defense (DoD), the National Guard, and the state and territorial 
                                                 
3 H. Steven Blum, “A  Vision for the National Guard,” Joint Force Quarterly, December 2004, 28. 
4  David M. Walker, Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response, GAO-06-808T (Washington, 
DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2006), 4. 
3 
governors.  Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander, USNORTHCOM, said there is no 
more important issue for him than the proposed research question.5  The uniformed 
military’s substandard performance during the Hurricane Katrina response and recovery 
exposed the scope and importance of the problem, and its problematic nature.  It also 
demonstrated improvement is imperative.  
This is a complex problem.  The operating environment has friction on many 
planes, such as between federal and state executives, between the federal government and 
sovereign states, between federal and state militaries, and so forth.  Governors do not 
want to give up control of their National Guardsmen, nor do they want federal forces in 
their state not under their control.  The governors would welcome models that allow for 
federal funding while preserving their control of the uniformed forces.  However, in a 
national catastrophe, the nation expects the federal government to take effective actions 
to mitigate the damages and restore normalcy. 
Title 10 U.S.C. 162(b) requires the active duty Title 10 military to have its chain 
of command run through the Secretary of Defense to the President, but not through a 
governor.  There are concerns regarding the qualifications and experience of National 
Guard general officers to effectively command and control large numbers of soldiers.  
For example, in the hurricane Katrina relief efforts, there were approximately 72,000 
uniformed troops, including 22,000 active-duty soldiers and more than 50,000 National 
Guardsmen, deployed in response.6  Command and control of that number of soldiers 
normally requires a corps commander, i.e., a three-star general.  There are no three-star 
National Guard general officers in any state or territory to command such an effort.  
There is none in the National Guard who has experience commanding corps-sized units. 
The potential for natural, man-made and terrorist caused national catastrophes is 
significant and the consequences are severe.  In the interest of preparedness, military 
planners must give serious thought and consideration to the issue and potential solutions  
 
                                                 
5 Admiral Timothy Keating, (Commander, United States Northern Command), interview with the 
author, Monterey, CA, February 1, 2006. 
6  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Emergencies and Disasters," 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/katrina.htm (accessed 01/31, 2006). 
4 
before crisis confronts policy makers again.  It is imperative that the National Guard and 
USNORTHCOM determine how they will work together in catastrophic disaster civil 
support operations before the next crisis. 
D.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
USNORTHCOM is a relatively new organization so there is not an abundance of 
existing literature that addresses the relationship between it and the National Guard, 
especially in civil support operations following catastrophic events.  Major General 
Timothy J. Lowenberg, the Adjutant General of Washington, does an excellent job of 
outlining the chains of command and funding for the National Guard with respect to the 
governors and DoD, depending on the Guard’s duty status.  The issue of state versus 
federal control is a key component in the debate regarding relationships between the 
National Guard and USNORTHCOM.  When performing civil support missions, Major 
General Lowenberg favors having the National Guard serve under the control of the 
governor and having the federal government fund the operations.7  He suggests having 
Title 10 personnel operate under the “supervisory authority” of the National Guard task 
force commander.  The term does not exist in joint doctrine.  He probably meant 
coordinating authority, i.e., the authority to require consultation between agencies 
involved but without the authority to compel agreement.8 
Brigadier General (Retired) Raymond E. Bell proposes making a National Guard 
general officer the commander of USNORTHCOM.  He also suggests the National Guard 
would become the force provider for USNORTHCOM’s operations.9  Although 
interesting, neither of these suggestions effectively advances the discussion of the 
command and control relationship between the National Guard and USNORTHCOM for 
civil support operations after catastrophes. 
                                                 
7  Timothy J. Lowenberg, The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland 
Security, Vol. 2006 (Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, 2005), 1-7, 
http://www.ngaus.org/ngaus/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000000457/primer%20fin.pdf (accessed 
January 31, 2006). 
8  Joint Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Vol. JP 0-2 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001), GL-6, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp0_2.pdf#search=%22jp%200-2%22 (accessed August 21, 
2006). 
9  Raymond E. Bell Jr., "U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard," Joint Force Quarterly : 
JFQ, no. 36 (December 2004), 36. 
5 
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, presents his 
vision for the National Guard as a joint force within each state and territory.10  He has 
instructed each state to establish a Joint Force Headquarters-State and two Joint Task 
Force headquarters to provide command and control over the National Guard operations 
within a state or territory.  While these initiatives move the National Guard in the 
direction it needs to go and make the force more efficient and relevant, the enhancements 
do not address the external command relationship problem.  
E.  TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS OR ANSWERS 
There are three general potential policy solutions to the research question.  The 
first would be to accept the current situation as the model.  This preserves the governor’s 
control of the National Guard, which would work cooperatively with the deployed federal 
forces subordinate to USNORTHCOM.  However, if the President federalizes the 
National Guard, it would be subordinate to USNORTHCOM resulting in unity of 
command by placing one commander over all federal military forces and removing the 
governor from the National Guard’s chain of command. 
A second solution for consideration would be to accept that the problem is too 
complex to have a standard approach for all situations and recognition that the 
relationship will always have to be situationally dependent.  With fifty-four sovereign 
state and territory governors and multiple scenarios to consider, it may be too hard to 
develop a plan with sufficient flexibility to apply across the spectrum of possible events.  
It could also be it is not possible to get the concurrence of those having to cede some 
degree of control of their assets, whether it is the governors or the USNORTHCOM 
commander.   
Lastly, there may be a permanent relationship between the National Guard and 
USNORTHCOM that provides continual situational awareness on a daily basis, but could 
expand for civil support operations.  This could present the situation whereby the 
National Guard gains a combatant commander as its advocate for enhanced federal 
resources while USNORTHCOM improves its capabilities to perform domestic 
operations. 
                                                 
10  H. Steven Blum, "A Vision for the National Guard,” 24. 
6 
At the beginning of this research, there was a high probability that the military 
would be in charge of catastrophic event disaster relief operations and it appeared unity 
of command was paramount.  High-level officials suggested there needed to be a more 
authoritative command and control arrangement when the consequences were great and 
the damages severe.  President Bush recommended that Congress examine the issue.11  
Press accounts quoted Admiral Keating as having suggested a similar idea for the most 
severe catastrophic events.12   
The state and territory governors voiced immediate and vigorous objection to 
even contemplating such proposals.13  The governors and their Adjutants General 
collectively rejected the suggestion and would not entertain it as a viable alternative.  
Because the political resistance was so intense, the administration backed away from the 
idea, at least in the public forum.  However, there has been continuing discussion at the 
federal level regarding if DoD should take a leadership role in emergency response to 
catastrophic events.14   
The net effect of this has been to make the research for this thesis more 
meaningful.  Rather than just building a case for the federal military to take control of all 
military assets in the catastrophe response effort, the political and legal aspects compelled 
a more nuanced and sophisticated consideration of the complex issues at hand.  
F.  PAPER ORGANIZATION 
To provide context for the reader, Chapter II leads with a review and description 
of the legal basis for the three duty statuses of the National Guard.  Chapter III reviews 
the Hurricane Katrina reports of investigation and their findings on Title 10 and Title 32 
command and control issues.  Chapter IV establishes the Constitutional and statutory 
context and Chapter V reviews the applicable policy documents.  Chapter VI reviews 
                                                 
11  Bill Sammon, "Bush Offers Pentagon as 'Lead Agency" in Disasters," Washington Times, 
September 26, 2005. 
12 Ann Imse, "Proposal Would Use Military in Disasters," Rocky Mountain News, October 26, 2005. 
13  Mark Sappenfield, "Battle Brews Over A Bigger Military Role," Christian Science Monitor, 
December 13, 2005. 
14  Michael Chertoff and Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum for the President, Katrina After Action 
Lessons Learned Recommendation that DoD and DHS Determine when the  Department of Defense Would 
be Involved in a Catastrophic Event - Natural or Man-Made, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, April 7, 2006), 1-2. 
7 
military policy guidance contained in joint doctrine publications.  Chapter VII presents 
the command and control alternative models with considerations for each.  Chapter VIII 
provides an analysis of the stakeholders, their interests and authorities.  Chapter IX 
reviews the USNORTHCOM civil support concept plan and provides analysis.  It 
determines that the character of the catastrophe’s nature and its impacts will shape the 
requirements for the C2 architecture.  The commander should consider the following as 
he develops his C2 recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and the President. 
• Politics 
• Effectiveness of response   
• Nature of the response and trend for the future 
• Requirement for regional uniformity of response 
• Size and composition of the response force 
• Planning time available 
• Duration of the support   
• Public expectation 
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II.  NATIONAL GUARD DUTY STATUS 
The National Guard is the only military component shared between the states and 
territories, and the federal government.  The National Guard can serve in three different 
duty statuses.  Although it appears to be technical and bureaucratic, the distinctions 
among them are important to understand because they have command and control, legal 
authority and funding implications.   
Many active duty soldiers do not routinely get exposure to the different duty 
statuses of the National Guard during their careers.  Often they do not appreciate the 
differences and their significance.  Part of the problem is terms such as “National Guard 
of the U.S.” and “National Guard in the service of the U.S.” appear so similar as to be the 
same.  Actually, they describe two different duty statuses, i.e., Title 10 and Title 32.  The 
term “National Guard” can mean state active duty or Title 32.  For those who do not work 
with the different duty statuses routinely, it can be frustrating and confusing. 
There may be another dynamic at work, too.  Depending on the author and his 
agenda, it may be convenient to use ambiguous terms.  For example, some reports 
following the Hurricane Katrina response cited DoD’s overwhelming support by the US 
military totaling more than 70,000 soldiers.15  Technically, DoD’s contribution was the 
active duty force of about 22,000 and only the funding for the 50,000 National 
Guardsmen who worked in state status.  Some in the National Guard see this as DoD 
improperly taking credit for work the National Guard did.16   
Because of both the intentional and unintentional use of fuzzy terms, documents 
may include terms that are ambiguous if not incorrect.  For example, “uniformed,”  
“military,” and “DoD resources” do not clearly define a specific component and readers 
with different backgrounds may interpret them differently.  The National Guard is 
uniformed, military and employs DoD resources in all three duty statuses.   
                                                 
15  U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 2006), 16, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf#search=%22quadrennial%20defense%20review%20report%
22 (accessed August 22, 2006). 
16  Christine E. Wormuth and others, The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, the Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report, (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2006), 84. 
10 
Even “federal” and “state” status can be unclear from a logic perspective, i.e., 
Title 32 is a federal status described in United States Code although control resides with 
the state.  According to the legal experts, however, the determination of whether the 
National Guard is in federal or state service depends not on who funds the activity, rather 
which entity has command and control.17  In the interest of clear and precise 
communication, all plans, regulations, policies and strategy documents referring to 
National Guard forces should include their mutually exclusive duty status, i.e., state 
active duty, Title 32 or Title 10. 
A. STATE ACTIVE DUTY 
When the governor calls up the National Guard to respond, it is in state active 
duty.  This is typically the National Guard’s status in response to disaster events or civil 
unrest.  In state active duty status, they have no command connection to DoD or the 
federal government.  The governor is their commander in chief, the state funds their 
operation and they operate according to state law.  While in state active duty status, the 
National Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and they may participate in law 
enforcement activities in accordance with the state constitution and law.  They are the 
National Guard of their state, e.g., the National Guard of Louisiana or the Louisiana 
National Guard. 
B. TITLE 32 UNITED STATES CODE  
Title 32 duty status allows use of the National Guard for a federal purpose but 
leaves command and control authority with the governor.  Because the missions executed 
in Title 32 status serve a federal purpose, the federal government funds it.  Typically, this 
is the duty status for Guardsmen during their training and other federally authorized 
operations.  For example, Title 32 U.S.C. 502(f) authorizes federal funding of the Guard 
for DoD approved operations.  At the President’s request, governors quickly placed 
Guardsmen in airports following the 9-11 attacks under this authority in 2001.  It was 
also the authority cited for the National Guard’s participation in the civil support 
                                                 
17  Center for Law and Military Operations, Domestic Operations Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for 
Judge Advocates, 2001, (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 
2001), 182-183.  
11 
operations following Hurricane Katrina.18  The federal government funded the operation 
while state governors commanded and controlled it.   
Governors must request Title 32 status for approval by the Secretary of Defense.  
Traditionally Title 32 U.S.C. 502(f) authorization was restricted to training rather than 
domestic operations.  Recently DoD has used it for civil support operations such the 2004 
political parties’ presidential conventions, the G8 summit and the current Operation Jump 
Start on the southwest border.  Title 32 U.S.C. 901 broadened the Secretary of Defense’s 
authority to direct and fund homeland defense activities at the request of the governors.  
Governor Blanco initially requested the funding for her Guard operations following 
Hurricane Katrina under this authority.  DoD determined the operation was a homeland 
security civil support mission rather than a homeland defense activity and approved the 
request under Title 32 U.S.C. 502(f).19 
Because it is under the governor’s command in Title 32 status, the National Guard 
may participate in law enforcement activities consistent with the state laws and 
constitution, i.e., the Posse Comitatus Act does not limit its law enforcement 
operations.20   
From the states’ perspective, Title 32 is the preferred status for the employment of 
their National Guard in civil support.  It gives the governors the best of all worlds, i.e., 
governor control of the National Guard with federal funding.  The National Governors 
Association adopted the position “when the National Guard members perform domestic 
missions they should do so in Title 32 U.S.C. status rather than Title 10 U.S.C. status, 
unless the President has called them in Title 10 for a federal mission requiring federal 
                                                 
18  Kenneth Bea, Organization and Mission of the Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Directorate: Issues and Options for the 109th Congress, RL33064, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
2005), 18, 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53095.pdf#search=%22crs%20report%20for%20congress%20r
l33064%22 (accessed August 22, 2006). 
19  Colonel Richard Chavez, (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense), 
interview with the author, Washington, DC, June 12, 2006. 
20  Center for Law and Military Operations, Domestic Operations Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for 
Judge Advocates, 2004, (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 
2004), 357-358, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law2004.pdf#search=%22domestic%20operations%20law%20handboo
k%20for%20judge%20advocates%202004%22 (accessed August 22, 2006). 
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troops, such as to repel an invasion.”21  As discussed under the Stafford Act in Chapter 
IV of this paper, Title 32 funding for civil support is problematic for DoD.  The Title 32 
costs come out of the DoD budget but the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) does not reimburse them.  This represents a significant departmental funding 
liability if DoD is to use Title 32 for future civil support operations. 
C. TITLE 10 UNITED STATES CODE 
Title 10 is federal service that DoD controls and funds.  It removes the governor 
and the state Adjutant General from the National Guard chain of command and replaces 
them with the President and the Secretary of Defense.  The President mobilizes National 
Guardsmen and DoD deploys them outside the United States in Title 10 status.  
Presidential use of the National Guard domestically in Title 10 status is controversial.  
Absent an invasion or rebellion that would lead to invoking the Insurrection Act, the 
governors do not favor the President’s use of Title 10 in the United States for domestic 
missions.22  While in Title 10 status, the National Guard is part of DoD. 
When the National Guard becomes part of the federal military, there are 
restrictions on its use and operations in the United States.  In Title 10 status, the Posse 
Comitatus Act applies and may limit its participation in law enforcement activities.  As 
members of the reserve component, the President cannot call up the National Guard for 
federal service to provide assistance to either the Federal Government or a state in time of 
a serious natural or manmade disaster, accident or catastrophe, per 10 U.S.C. 12304(c).   
D. SUMMARY 
The following National Guard Bureau matrix summarizes the three duty statuses 
and the compares the effect each has on key aspects.  
                                                 
21  National Governors Association, Policy Position HHS-03, Army and Air National Guard Policy, 
(Washington, DC: February 27, 2004), 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.8358ec82f5b198d18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=24ca9e2f
1b091010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD (accessed August 27, 2006). 
22  Jennifer Steinhauer, "Governors Resist Shifting Authority Over Guard," The New York Times, 
August 15, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/15/us/15governors.html?ei=5094&en=c6a303540e70c772&hp=&ex=11
55700800&partner=homepage&pagewanted=print (accessed August 15, 2006). 
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Figure 1. National Guard Duty Status Comparison23  
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III.  IS THERE A PROBLEM? 
During the response and recovery operations following Hurricane Katrina, the 
President, the Chief of National Guard Bureau and the Governor of Louisiana could not 
come to an early agreement on a command and control architecture for the federal forces 
and the state National Guard.  The President proposed placing a Title 10 commander in 
dual status as a Title 32 officer to command both the federal military and National Guard 
of Louisiana.  Governor Blanco felt she would lose control of her National Guard in this 
arrangement and declined the President’s proposal.  The negotiations were time-
consuming and may have delayed the deployment of federal forces to assist the 
devastated population.24 
After the civil support operations concluded, numerous reports and investigations 
found improvement in achieving unity of effort was necessary.  The White House 
published its February 2006 report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons 
Learned.  It found under the Critical Challenge:  Integrated Use of Military Capabilities 
that the Department of Defense should ensure the transformation of the National Guard 
focuses on increased integration with active duty forces for homeland security plans and 
activities.25  
The United States Government Accountability Office provided a statement for the 
record on May 25, 2006 titled Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to 
Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.  While noting that the 
military mounted a massive response that saved many lives, it determined DoD needs to 
take action to integrate the military’s active duty and Reserve and National Guard forces 
in civil support.  The current plan does “not address key questions of integration, 
                                                 
24  Spencer Hsu, Joby Warrick and Rob Stein, "Documents Highlight Bush - Blanco Standoff," The 
Washington Post, December 5, 2005. 
25  White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:  Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: 
2006), 94, http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-
learned.pdf#search=%22the%20federal%20response%20to%20hurricane%20katrina%3A%20lessons%20l
earned%22 (accessed August 22, 2006). 
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command and control, and division of tasks between National Guard resources under 
state control and federal resources under U.S. Northern Command’s control.”26 
The United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs released its report, Hurricane Katrina:  A Nation Still Unprepared, dated May 
2006.  Their Recommendation 70 is “DoD and the States should develop the systems and 
process of communication, coordination, and command and control, to ensure unity of 
effort when National Guard and Title 10 forces are deployed in integrated disaster 
response missions.”27 
The Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response 
to Hurricane Katrina released their report titled A Failure of Initiative on February 15, 
2006.  They reported there were two distinct military chains of command—one for 
federal troops and one for National Guard under state command.  “This dual chain of 
command structure…contributed to a poorly coordinated federal response.”28 
In summary, all of the investigations reported there were deficiencies in the 
integration of the efforts of the National Guard working for the governor of Louisiana 
and the federal military forces working for the President.  
The press contained anecdotes of missed coordination.  There were reports of 
multiple helicopters responding to rescue victims stranded by the floodwaters.  The 
Defense Coordinating Officer reported he had difficulty validating missions for the Title 
10 military because he did not have visibility over the National Guard activities.  The 
press reported that inadequate coordination between the National Guard and Title 10 
forces delayed evacuation operations at the Superdome.29  Taken together, there is ample 
evidence that the command and control of the civil support operations were insufficient.  
                                                 
26  Walker, Preliminary Observations on Hurricane Response, GAO-06-808T, 10. 
27  U.S. Senate, Hurricane Katrina, A Nation Still Unprepared, Report of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, (Washington, DC: 2006), Rec-25, 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/FullReport.pdf (accessed August 22, 2006). 
28  U.S. House of Representatives, Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, DC: 2006), 
http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm (accessed August 22, 2006). 





IV. REVIEW OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND PERTINENT 
STATUTES 
 
The United States is a nation of laws.  The Constitution is the legal foundation.  It, 
with amendments and statutes, gives authorities and limits to the branches and levels of 
government.  In addition to the balance of power the authors intended, it established a 
government that is always in dynamic tension as the branches and levels attempt to tip 
the balance to serve their interests.  This tension results in friction among the actors. 
A. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION   
The Constitution defines the nation as a union of sovereign states with a federal 
government to operate that union.  The Constitution provides the basis for the republican 
form of government, and defines the roles and authorities of the different branches and 
levels of government with respect to the military.  It recognizes the value of the militias 
under the states’ control.  However, the Constitution also recognizes the need to raise 
armies for the nation. 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war, 
to raise and support armies and to make rules for the government and regulation of them.  
Clause 15 authorizes Congress “to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”  Clause 16 is important 
because it gives broad authority to the Congress over the National Guard, i.e., “to provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them 
as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” 
Article II, Section 2 designates the President as the commander in chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States.  The section also names the President as the 
commander in chief of the state militias, i.e., National Guard, when called into service of 
the United States.  Today, we recognize the National Guard of the United States as a 
federal reserve military force in Title 10 status as described in Chapter II. 
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Amendment X states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
the people.” 
B. TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE   
See Chapter II. 
C. TITLE 32, UNITED STATES CODE  
See Chapter II. 
D. POSSE COMITATUS ACT, 18 U.S.C. 1385 
The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) is a criminal statute that prohibits the use of the 
Title 10 Air Force and Army forces to perform law enforcement activities except as 
authorized by the Constitution or statute.  DoD administratively extended the prohibition 
to the Navy and Marine Corps.  The primary prohibition is against Title 10 forces’ direct 
involvement in traditional law enforcement activities, such as search, seizure, arrests, 
apprehension and interdicting vehicles.  One of the exceptions is the Insurrection Act, 
discussed below.  PCA does not apply to the National Guard in state active duty or Title 
32 status.  In those statuses, the governor may use the National Guard to enforce local, 
state and federal laws, consistent with the laws and constitution of the state.  This makes 
the National Guard a powerful and flexible military tool for the governors.  Once the 
President places the National Guard into Title 10 status, PCA restrictions apply.30   
The issue came up during the civil support operations following Hurricane 
Katrina.  The 82nd Airborne Division, Title 10 forces, patrolled the streets of New 
Orleans.  Their presence had the effect of suppressing criminal behavior.  The military 
claimed it was merely showing presence and was not engaged in prohibited law 
enforcement activities.  The Congressional Research Service felt active duty military 
patrols were inconsistent with the PCA.31 
 
                                                 
30  Center for Law and Military Operations, Domestic Operations Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for 
Judge Advocates, 2004, 357-358. 
31  Jennifer Elsea, The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues, RS22266, 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005), 4, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf#search=%22Congressional%20Research%20service%20rs
22266%22 (accessed August 21, 2006). 
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E. INSURRECTION ACT, 10 U.S.C. 331-335 
The Insurrection Act authorizes the President to deploy federal military forces 
into a state to suppress insurrections, rebellions and domestic violence, or to enforce state 
and federal laws.  He may use the military to restore order, prevent looting, and engage in 
other law enforcement activities that the PCA would otherwise prohibit.  He has the 
authority to federalize the National Guard for these purposes.32   
Presidents have exercised the Insurrection Act in the not too distant past.  For 
example, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy effectively used it to enforce civil rights 
laws in the South.  Without the consent of the state governor, President Eisenhower 
placed the Arkansas National Guard into Title 10 federal service to enforce integration of 
Little Rock schools in 1957.  In 1963, President Kennedy placed the Alabama National 
Guard in Title 10 federal service to remove it from Governor Wallace’s control and to 
enforce federal civil rights laws at the University of Alabama. 
In 1992, President Bush exercised the Insurrection Act at the request of the 
California governor to quell the rioting following the Rodney King incident in Los 
Angeles.  He also placed the California National Guard into Title 10 status.  In this case, 
the federal force commander’s misunderstanding of the Insurrection Act and the PCA 
resulted in his imposing inappropriate restrictions on the use of the federal forces.  The 
result was a significant reduction in the utility and effectiveness of the National Guard in 
its mission execution.33 
F. THE ROBERT T. STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY 
ASSISTANCE ACT (PL 93-288), 42 U.S.C. 5121 – 5206, ET SEQ 
The Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations and 
direct federal agencies including DoD to provide assistance to states overwhelmed by 
disasters.  The Stafford Act gives the President authority to deploy federal military forces 
into the states or territories for defense support of civil authorities missions when the 
governors request it.   
                                                 
32  Elsea, The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues, RS22266, 3. 
33  Thomas R. Lujan, "Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army," Parameters, Autumn 
1997, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/97autumn/lujan.htm (accessed August 21, 2006). 
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In implementing the Stafford Act, FEMA reimburses DoD’s incremental costs 
associated with providing requested civil support following a President declared disaster.  
This means that the costs DoD would pay regardless of the civil support operations, for 
example, soldiers’ pay and allowances, FEMA will not reimburse.  This interpretation is 
problematic for DoD when it employs National Guard soldiers in Title 32 status for civil 
support.  FEMA does not reimburse DoD for the soldiers' pay and allowances even 
though the National Guard would not be in Title 32 status but for the civil support 
operation.  Alternatively, states may receive federal assistance in funding their National 
Guard in state active duty costs on a shared basis.  This means that unless FEMA waives 
the state portion of the shared cost, the states and territories must pay a portion of the cost 
of their National Guard in state active duty status under the Stafford Act.34 
G. HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002, 6 U.S.C. 101 - 1557 (2002)  
This act implements Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 and 
establishes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by merging several agencies.  It 
designates DHS as the federal lead for natural and manmade crises and emergency 
planning.  DHS coordinates the federal response resources in major disasters.  The 
current interpretation is this law would not allow DoD to act as a lead agency for a 
homeland security event. 
H. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, 50 U.S.C. 1601 – 1651 (2003)  
This law provides procedures for Presidential declaration of national emergencies.  
The President must identify the specific provision of the law under which he will act in 
dealing with a declared national emergency.  The Presidential declaration of a national 
emergency under the act is a prerequisite to exercising any special or extraordinary 
powers authorized by statute for use in the event of a national emergency.35 
I. THE ECONOMY ACT, 31 U.S.C. 1535 – 1536, (2002) 
The Economy Act allows federal agencies to purchase goods and services from 
other federal sources on a reimbursable basis.  This act is sometimes employed before the 
President triggers the Stafford Act with a disaster declaration.  It ensures federal agencies 
do not augment their congressionally approved appropriations by having other 
                                                 
34  Chavez, interview, Washington, DC, June 12, 2006. 
35  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, DC: 2004), 80, 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NRP_FullText.pdf (accessed August 22, 2006). 
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departments perform the requestors’ mission without reimbursement.  For example, DHS 
cannot request DoD perform one of their homeland security missions without DHS 
funding it. 
J. SUMMARY 
The Constitution and statutes give significant authority to the President to act, but 
also place limits on him.  Usually the governors must invite the federal government into 
their states and territories.  Normally the governors will command the National Guard, 
but there are provisions to have it under the command of the President.  PCA may limit 
Title 10 forces from performing law enforcement functions.  There are instances such as 
the Insurrection Act in which the President can act unilaterally, but there are onerous 
implications of such action.  The law that established DHS made it the principal federal 
agency in preparation for and responding to emergencies.  Other federal agencies 
including DoD respond to DHS requests for assistance. 
This model sets up an inherent conflict in civil support operations following 
catastrophic events.  DHS has the statutory authority to respond, but lacks the organic 



























V. REVIEW OF STRATEGY AND POLICY DOCUMENTS 
This chapter reviews the strategy and policy documents as they pertain to civil 
support operations following catastrophic events.  In particular, it examines the guidance 
and policy that apply to USNORTHCOM and the National Guard in those operations.  
Strategy in its basic form defines the ends, ways and means.  Generally, the following 
strategy documents do a good job of laying out the desired ends.  However, they 
occasionally employ broad terms when describing the ways and means because the 
precise enabling legal foundation to achieve the ends does not exist.  With respect to the 
National Guard, some of the ambiguous terms in the strategy and policy documents 
include “military forces,” “uniformed forces,” “armed forces,” “military support” and 
“DoD resources.”  The reader must take into account the originating office’s authority, 
the context of the reference and the legal basis that supports it before he can understand 
the implications of the document. 
A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS), MARCH 2006   
This is the President’s capstone security strategy document.  The strategy focuses 
primarily on international security.  Other than noting the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security, it is silent on civil support.  One of the stated national 
security priorities is minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks 
that do occur.  The NSS observes that DoD completed its 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, discussed later in this chapter.  In that section of the NSS, it notes DoD is 
transforming itself to better balance its capabilities across four categories of challenges 
including catastrophic challenges involving natural disasters that produce weapons of 
mass destruction-like effects.36    
B. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (NSHS), JULY 
2002  
This document focuses on the nation’s preparedness for countering terrorist 
attacks, but it includes natural disasters as well.  In its Executive Summary, the NSHS 
addresses Emergency Preparedness and Response in stating that an effective response to 
a major terrorist incident and natural disasters depends on being prepared.  The nation 
                                                 
36  White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
2006), 43-44. 
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needs a comprehensive national system to bring together and coordinate all necessary 
response assets quickly and effectively.  It must plan, equip, train, and exercise many 
different response units to mobilize without warning for any emergency.37   Because the 
strategy predates the Homeland Security Act of 2002, it includes a section noting that per 
the President’s proposal, DHS will consolidate federal response plans and build a 
national system for incident management in cooperation with state and local government.  
Among the twelve major initiatives of the NSHS is one to prepare an integrated single 
all-discipline incident management plan, i.e., the National Response Plan, and to plan for 
military support to civil authorities. 
The strategy states DoD contributes to homeland security through its military 
missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.  DoD would be 
involved during emergencies such as responding to forest fires, floods, tornadoes or other 
catastrophes.  In these emergencies, DHS may ask DoD to act quickly provide 
capabilities other agencies do not have.38 
The NSHS notes the establishment of USNORTHCOM and describes its role in 
homeland security. 
In April 2002, President Bush approved a revision of the Unified 
Command Plan that included the establishing a new unified combatant 
command, U.S. Northern Command.  This command will be responsible 
for homeland defense and for assisting civil authorities in accordance with 
U.S. law.  As in the case with all other combatant commanders, the 
commander of Northern Command will take all operational orders from 
and is responsible to the President through the Secretary of Defense.  The 
commander of Northern Command will update plans to provide military 
support to domestic civil authorities in response to natural and man-made 
disasters and during national emergencies.39   
It does not make an overt distinction to exclude the National Guard from the 
military support to civil authority mission although the USNORTHCOM commander has 
no command authority over or planning responsibility for the National Guard except 
when it is in Title 10 status and assigned to him.   
                                                 
37  Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 2002), x, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf (accessed August 22, 2006). 
38  Ibid., 13. 
39  Ibid., 45. 
25 
C.   THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, MARCH 2005 
This is DoD’s strategy that sets defense objectives, one of which is protecting the 
homeland.  DoD contributes to protecting the U.S. Homeland by sustaining the offensive 
against terrorist organizations and by providing defense support to civil authorities as the 
President directs.  DoD is committed to act quickly in emergencies to provide unique 
capabilities to other federal agencies when the need surpasses the capacities of civilian 
responders and when directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.40  
This strategy addresses the federal military only and does not include the National Guard 
except when it is in Title 10 status. 
D. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (NMS) OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA, 2004   
The NMS is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s document to provide 
strategic direction and guidance to the federal military forces regarding military 
objectives.  This document predates the current National Defense Strategy.  In its 
Defensive Actions at Home section, the NMS states, “During emergencies the Armed 
Forces may provide military support to civil authorities in mitigating the consequences of 
an attack or other catastrophic event when civilian responders are overwhelmed.  Military 
responses under these conditions require a streamlined chain of command that integrates 
the unique capabilities of active and reserve military components and civilian 
responders.”41  This passage includes some of the ambiguous terminology referred to at 
the beginning of this chapter, i.e., military responses.  In that this is the national military 
strategy, it applies to federal military only and not the National Guard unless it is in Title 
10 status. 
E.   STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT, JUNE 
2005  
This document provides key definitions that shape the DoD approach to civil 
support.  The authors write carefully to provide a coherent strategy but employ some 
                                                 
40  U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 
(Washington, DC: 2005), 9-10, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2.pdf (accessed 
August 22, 2006). 
41  Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, DC: 
2004), 9, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf#search=%22national%20military%20strate
gy%20of%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America%22 (accessed August 22, 2006). 
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broad terms because their office lacks the specific legal authority to speak for or to direct 
the sovereign states and territories’ National Guard.  As such, it creates a zone of 
ambiguity by defining DoD ends without providing clear authorized ways to achieve 
them.  This strategy came out only months before Hurricane Katrina struck the United 
States 
The strategy makes it clear that DoD recognizes DHS as the lead federal agency 
in preparing for, responding to and recovering from major domestic disasters.  It defines 
defense support of civil authorities, often referred to as civil support, as DoD support, 
including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor 
personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies.  DoD 
provides defense support of civil authorities only when directed to do so by the President 
or Secretary of Defense.  As written, this definition of civil support does not include the 
National Guard unless the President places it in Title 10 status.42 
The strategy states the President will direct DoD to provide substantial support to 
civil authorities in the event of major catastrophes and DoD will plan, practice, and 
carefully integrate their civil support into the national response.  USNORTHCOM is 
responsible for planning, organizing, and executing homeland defense and civil support 
missions within the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters.  It goes on to 
say, “This Strategy reflects a Total Force approach to homeland defense missions, 
incorporating the capabilities of Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve forces...  
Forces must also be prepared to conduct the full spectrum of domestic civil support 
missions when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense to do so.”43  The 
authors word this section very carefully.  As part of the DoD reserve forces, the National 
Guard is obligated to train for its homeland defense mission.  However, the President and 
Secretary of Defense can only direct it when it is in Title 10 status, so the instruction for 
the civil support mission is more of an expressed desire rather than an authoritative 
directive for the National Guard. 
                                                 
42  U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, (Washington, DC: 
2005), 5-6, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf#search=%22strategy%20for%20home
land%20defense%20and%20civil%20support%22 (accessed August 22, 2006). 
43  Ibid., 35. 
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The strategy calls for focused reliance upon the reserve component.  “Homeland 
defense and civil support are Total Force responsibilities.  However, the nation needs to 
focus particular attention on better using the competencies of National Guard and 
Reserve component organizations.  The National Guard is particularly well suited for 
civil support missions.  As with other Reserve components, the National Guard is 
forward deployed in 3,200 communities through the nation.  In addition, it is readily 
accessible in Sate Active Duty and Title 32 status, routinely exercised with local law 
enforcement, first responders, and the remainder of the Total Force, and experienced in 
supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis.”44  The authors’ carefully chosen 
wording creates the sense of a coherent strategy.  Its admonishment that the nation focus 
on the National Guard’s competencies is because DoD does not have the authority to do 
so.  Although the National Guard is forward deployed, it only falls under the command of 
the President when he places it in Title 10 status.  Otherwise, it is an asset of the state or 
territorial governor. 
This strategy commits DoD to maintain a ready, capable, and agile command and 
control structure, along with competently trained forces, to assist civilian authorities with 
catastrophic incident response.  In this context, it is referring to the active duty forces 
only, not the National Guard. 
F.   THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP) 04, MARCH 1, 2005   
The President provides his instructions to the combatant commanders in the UCP.  
In it, he establishes the combatant commanders’ missions, responsibilities and force 
structure as well as their geographic areas of responsibility and functions.  It directs that 
the combatant commander will have command of all forces operating in his geographic 
area of operations except as otherwise directed.  Furthermore, the combatant command 
shall exercise command authority over all commands and forces assigned to his 
command.  USNORTHCOM is one of the exceptions.  USNORTHCOM does not have 
command of all DoD forces in its area of responsibility because the area includes the 
continental United States and Alaska, home for the preponderance of DoD’s Title 10 
forces.  Instead, USNORTHCOM commands only those forces the Secretary of Defense 
assigns to it for military operations.  USNORTHCOM will not command any portion of 
                                                 
44  U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 35. 
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the National Guard unless the President places units in Title 10 status as the National 
Guard of the United States and the Secretary of Defense assigns those units to 
USNORTHCOM.   
The UCP directs combatant commanders to plan for and execute military 
operations as directed in support of the National Military Strategy.  Commanders will 
certify the readiness of assigned headquarters staffs designated to perform as a joint task 
force (JTF).  Combatant commanders provide the single point of contact on military 
matters within their assigned areas of responsibility, excluding the United States for the 
reason above. 
The UCP assigns USNORTHCOM its area of responsibility as the continental 
United States and Alaska, Canada and Mexico.  It instructs the USNORTHCOM 
commander to provide civil support and other assistance to U.S. civil authorities as 
directed.45  All of the UCP addresses Title 10 forces only and not the National Guard. 
G. FORCES FOR UNIFIED COMMANDS, FY 2006 (U) 
This document provides the Secretary of Defense’s direction to the Secretaries of 
the Military Departments for assigning forces to the combatant commands.  Paragraph 3, 
Authorities of Combatant Commanders and Responsibilities of Assigned Units, contains 
helpful language.  It states “coordinating authority may be established via a memorandum 
of agreement between Title 10 and non-federalized (e.g., Title 32) National Guard forces 
to promote unity of effort.  The commander or individual has the authority to require 
consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel 
agreement.”46  Although the Secretary does not address this language to the 
USNORTHCOM commander, at least it gives the commander license to coordinate with 
the non-federalized National Guard. 
H. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, FEBRUARY 6, 2006 
This report contains a narrative review of DoD’s recent accomplishments.  U.S. 
forces responded to natural disasters at home.  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
prepositioned forces arrived in neighborhoods of Gulf Coast communities within four 
                                                 
45  White House, Unified Command Plan 2004 (Washington, DC: 2005), 1-10. 
46  U.S. Department of Defense, Forces for Unified Commands FY 2006 (U) (Washington, DC: 2005), 
II-4. 
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hours after the storm hit, to assist rescue efforts.  More than 50,000 National Guard 
personnel deployed to the disaster zone.  Active forces added an additional 22,000.  
DoD’s response to Hurricane Katrina and other civil support operations provided 
valuable lessons for improving force integration and command and control in large, 
complex interagency operations.  As the authors wrote this, it appears DoD takes credit 
for the National Guard’s work even though the National Guard served in Title 32 status 
and was not part of DoD for the operation. 
The section titled Operations Lessons Learned notes recent operations 
demonstrate the critical importance of organizing to work with and through others.  The 
operations “underscore the importance of adopting a more indirect approach to achieve 
common objectives…at home it includes other Federal agencies and state and local 
governments.”47 
The section titled Achieving Unity of Effort includes direction on complex 
interagency operations at in the United States.  It states unified interagency efforts are 
important and that DoD must work as part of a unified interagency effort with the 
Department of Homeland Security and other federal, state and local agencies to address 
threats to the U.S. homeland.  In addition, the response to Hurricane Katrina vividly 
illustrated the need for DoD to support other agencies in the context of complex 
interagency operations at home.  It commits DoD to, at the request of the Department of 
Homeland Security, organize and sponsor homeland defense tabletop exercises, in which 
senior leaders from civilian and military agencies practice responses to disaster scenarios.  
It is not clear whether this would include the National Guard in the training audience or 
not.48 
The Quadrennial Defense Review Report contains a section on “Operationalizing 
the Strategy.”  It observes that capabilities to mitigate attacks on the U.S. homeland may 
also play a role in responding to natural disasters, as the response to Hurricane Katrina 
demonstrated.  The ultimate goal is to develop the capacity of other agencies and state 
and local governments to respond to domestic incidents so that they will be sufficient to 
                                                 
47  U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 17. 
48  Ibid., 87. 
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perform their assigned responsibilities with minimal reliance on U.S. military support.  
To that end, DoD will develop concepts of operations to leverage its strengths in areas 
such as planning, training and command and control, in support of its interagency 
homeland security partners.  The reference to U.S. military support does not include the 
National Guard except when it is in Title 10 status.  DoD could demonstrate its 
commitment to this strategy by resourcing the National Guard’s capability for civil 
support when it is not in Title 10 status. 
In the “Support” section, the report notes that at the direction of the President or 
the Secretary of Defense, DoD supports civil authorities as a part of a comprehensive 
national response to recover from a disaster.  DoD’s substantial humanitarian 
contributions to relief efforts in the aftermaths of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita fall into 
this category.  In the future, should other catastrophes overwhelm civilian capacity, DHS 
may call upon DoD to respond rapidly with additional resources as part of an overall U.S. 
Government effort. 
In the “Enable” section the report commits DoD to work with DHS and with state 
and local governments to improve homeland security capabilities and cooperation.  It 
notes the need for “capabilities to manage the consequences of major catastrophic events” 
and suggests the need for “new or expanded authorities to improve access to Guard and 
reserve forces for use in the event of a man-made or natural disaster.”49  This refers to an 
expedited means for the President to mobilize, involuntarily if necessary, National Guard 
forces in Title 10 status for civil support operations. 
I.   NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, DECEMBER 15, 2004 WITH CHANGE   
Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 direction, the NRP 
combined all of the federal emergency plans into an integrated, all-hazards approach to 
domestic incident management.  It sought to unify the domestic emergency management 
by improving coordination at the federal, state and local levels.  DHS thoroughly staffed 
and coordinated the NRP before thirty federal department secretaries, administrators and 
directors, and two non-governmental organization presidents signed it and it went into 
effect.  The civil support portions for the federal military model the practices of the pre-
existing Federal Response Plan and incorporate only minor changes.                                                  
49 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 27.  
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The NRP outlines roles and responsibilities.  It says that as a state’s chief 
executive, the governor is responsible for the public safety and welfare of the people of 
the state or territory.  Also, “The Governor is the Commander-in-Chief of State military 
forces (National Guard when in state active duty or Title 32 Status and the authorized 
State militias).”50  This language is exact and accurate. 
The NRP notes DoD has significant resources that may be available to support the 
federal response to an Incident of National Significance.  It recognizes the authority of 
the Secretary of Defense includes authorizing “Defense Support of Civil Authorities for 
domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness 
operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law.  The Secretary of 
Defense retains command of military forces under DSCA, as with all other situations and 
operations.”51  The NRP includes the definition of defense support of civil authorities as 
DoD support provided by federal military forces, DoD civilians and contract personnel, 
and DoD agencies and components, in response to requests for assistance during 
domestic incidents to include terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, and other 
emergencies.52  
It observes that concepts of “command” and “unity of command” have distinct 
legal and cultural meanings for military forces and operations.  For military forces, 
command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the 
combatant command to the commander of the forces.  The “Unified Command” concept 
utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command.  The NRP 
repeats that the Secretary of Defense retains command of military forces providing civil 
support.53  All of these references in the DoD section could have been clearer if the 
authors had included “federal” before the word “military.”  In general, it is clear that 
DoD controls the Title 10 forces only. 
The NRP clearly and accurately captures the command relationship between the 
federal military forces and the National Guard not in federal status.  Based on the 
                                                 
50  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, 8. 
51  Ibid., 10. 
52  Ibid., 41. 
53  Ibid., 10. 
32 
magnitude, type of incident and anticipated level of resource involvement, the supported 
combatant commander may utilize a Joint Task Force (JTF) to command federal (Title 
10) military activities in support of the incident.  The collocation of the JTF command 
and control element does not replace the requirement for a Defense Coordinating Officer 
as a part of the Joint Field Office coordination staff and it will not coordinate requests for 
assistance for DoD.  A JTF commander exercises operational control of all allocated DoD 
resources (excluding U.S. Army Corps of Engineers resources, National Guard forces 
operating in state active duty or Title 32 status).  The NRP also notes correctly that Army 
and Air National Guard Forces, i.e., National Guard forces employed under state active 
duty or Title 32 status, are providing support to the governor of their state or territory and 
are not part of federal military response efforts.54 
J. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-5, 
MANAGEMENT OF DOMESTIC INCIDENTS, FEBRUARY 28, 2003 
HSPD-5 names the Secretary of DHS as the Principal Federal Official for 
domestic incident management.  It directs him to prepare the NRP.  It preserves the 
authority of the Secretary of Defense over DoD and as well as the chain of command for 
military forces to the President as the Commander in Chief.  It directs the Secretary of 
Defense to provide military support for civil authorities for domestic incidents as the 
President directs or when consistent with military readiness and law.  The Secretary of 
Defense retains command of military forces providing civil support.55  “Military forces” 
in this context refers to federal military forces, not state military forces. 
K. HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD-8, 
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, DECEMBER 17, 2003 
This is a companion to HSPD-5.  It describes the way federal departments and 
agencies will prepare for a response to a domestic incident.  It tasks DoD to provide 
information describing the organizations and functions of DoD that may provide support 
to civil authorities during a domestic crisis.56  This direction includes Title 10 forces 
only. 
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The strategy for civil support purports to be one of focused reliance on the 
National Guard and reserves.  However, there is no effective way to compel the National 
Guard to adopt this strategy.  USNORTHCOM is responsible for planning the Title 10 
part of the mission only.  There is no directive to the USNORTHCOM commander to 
plan for the National Guard’s participation in civil support operations unless they are in 
Title 10 status.  The “Forces For” document authorizes the commander to exercise 
coordinating authority with the National Guard in Title 32 status and to direct subordinate 
commanders to do the same.  All of the policy documents contemplate separate chains of 
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VI. JOINT MILITARY DOCTRINE 
The military refers to its policy as doctrine.  Joint publications contain the military 
doctrine.  This chapter reviews joint military doctrine as it applies to civil support 
following domestic catastrophic events. 
A. JOINT PUBLICATION 0-2, UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES 
This publication provides doctrine and military guidance governing unified 
direction of forces.  It states unity of effort requires coordination among government 
departments and agencies.  The Constitution, federal law and the national interest all 
influence national unified action.  The Secretary of Defense is responsible to the 
President for national military unity of effort in creating, supporting and employing 
military capabilities.57  A casual reading of this passage might lead one to conclude that 
the “national military” would include the National Guard in Title 32 and state active duty 
status.  It does not.   
Obtaining coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation is not the 
same as command and control of a military operation.  Unity of effort results only 
through close continuous interagency coordination and cooperation.  The publication 
defines coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an 
authority by which command may be exercised.  However, coordinating authority is more 
applicable to planning than to operations.58 
B. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-07, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY 
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR   
DoD classifies emergency support to civil authorities operations as Military 
Operations Other Than War, separate and distinct from war or combat operations.  One of 
the main points the doctrine highlights is the primacy of political objectives.  It states, 
“political objectives drive Military Operations Other Than War at every level from 
strategic to tactical.”  Military personnel should understand the political objectives.  It 
                                                 
57  Joint Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), I-3. 
58  Ibid., I-11 - III-12. 
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admonishes commanders to be aware of changes in the political objective that may 
warrant a change in military operations.59 
Unity of effort is one of the principles for Military Operations Other Than War.  
The joint doctrine states it is derived from the principle of war, unity of command, but 
notes achieving unity of effort is complicated by varying views of the objective.  
Commanders must rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.  
Command arrangements among partners may be less well defined and not include full 
command authority.  In these circumstances, commanders must establish procedures for 
liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort.60 
C. JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26, HOMELAND SECURITY 
This publication contains the doctrine that applies to DoD’s role in homeland 
defense and civil support operations.  The publication describes the relationship of 
homeland defense to homeland security using this familiar diagram.   
HLS / HLD Paradigm HLS / HLD Paradigm 
Homeland Security / Homeland Defense Paradigm
Homeland Security (DHS Lead) 
A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the US, reduce America’s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur. (National Strategy for Homeland Security)
Homeland Defense (DoD Lead)
The protection of US sovereignty, territory, 
domestic population and critical defense 
infrastructure against external threats and 
aggression. (Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support)
Civil Support
DoD support provided by Federal military 
forces, DoD civilian and contract personnel, 
and DoD agency and components, in 
response to requests for assistance during 
domestic incidents to include terrorist threats 
or attacks, major disasters and other 
emergencies.  DoD provides DSCA, i.e., civil 
support, when directed to do so by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense. 
(National Response Plan)
 
Figure 2. Homeland Security / Homeland Defense Paradigm61                                                  
59  Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1995), I-2, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf (accessed August 21, 2006). 
60  Ibid., I-2. 
61  After Figure I-3, Relationship of Emergency Preparedness to Homeland Security Mission Areas, 
Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 
2005), I-4, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf (accessed August 21, 2006). 
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Homeland defense is the primary responsibility of DoD.  For homeland defense 
activities, DoD acts as the lead federal agency and other agencies provide required 
support.  For homeland security activities, DHS has the primary responsibility and other 
agencies, including DoD, provide required support.  For the area shown as Civil Support, 
DHS has the primary responsibility and acts as the principal or lead federal agency.  DoD 
provides requested support when the President directs it. 
With respect to command and control, regardless of whether DoD is conducting 
homeland defense or civil support operations, military forces will remain under the 
control of the established Title 10, Title 32 or state active duty military chain of 
command.  The Secretary of Defense will retain control of assigned Title 10 military 
forces providing civil support.  As the designated command for overall command and 
control of DoD support to civil authorities within its area of responsibility, 
USNORTHCOM embodies the principles of unity of effort and unity of command.62  
The policy anticipates the National Guard will remain in state active duty or Title 32 
status, and recognizes the advantages associated with those statuses, most notably no 
Posse Comitatus Act restraints.  It describes the combined response of Title 10, Title 32 
and / or state active duty forces employed in response to incidents.63  
D. SUMMARY 
The joint doctrine for civil support is appropriate and helpful.  The tendency for 
military officers is to view all operations from the perspective of their military experience 
and training.  Because that experience usually centers on combat operations for active 
duty officers, they automatically look for familiar operational paradigms to apply.  This 
leads them to seek unity of command rather than unity of effort.  However, there are 
important differences between combat operations and operations other than war.  The 
joint doctrine captures these differences.  The problem lies in knowing, understanding 
and applying the appropriate doctrine. 
The doctrine for civil support emphasizes unity of effort but acknowledges that 
achieving it is challenging, especially in operations involving interagency actions.  For 
                                                 
62  Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security, II-7. 
63  Ibid., IV-1 – IV-4. 
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combat or war operations, unity of command is a guiding principle.  Doctrine changes the 
principle to unity of effort for military operations other than war. 
Specific joint doctrine addressing command and control for civil support 
operations following catastrophic events does not exist.  Existing doctrine recognizes 
USNORTHCOM will exercise command and control over the Title 10 forces and assets 
in civil support operations.  It goes on to state the National Guard will usually operate 
under the control of the governor.  While it recognizes the separate chains of command 
for federal and state military forces, doctrine is silent on how to achieve unity of effort 
between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard operating in state status during civil 
support operations.  
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VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL OPTIONS 
There are three basic alternatives available to establish the command and control 
(C2) architecture for the military involved in civil support operations following 
catastrophic events.  One is to federalize all of the military forces and place them 
subordinate to a Title 10 commander.  A second option is to place a commanding officer 
into dual Title 10 and Title 32 status so that he commands both the federal military and 
the National Guard in Title 32 and state active duty status.  Lastly, there is the parallel C2 
structure with the Title 10 federal chain of command up to the President, and the Title 32 
and state active duty National Guard chain of command up to the governor.  Each C2 
construct has its relative strengths and weaknesses.  This chapter describes the options 
with analysis of their advantages and disadvantages.  An analysis of the stakeholders and 
their interests completes the chapter. 
A. DEFINITION 
Command and Control:  The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces on the 
accomplishment of the mission.  Command and Control functions are 
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in 
planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in 
the accomplishment of the mission.64  
B. C2 OPTIONS 
1. Option 1.  Consolidate Command and Control of All Military Under 
One Commander  
The United States goes to war abroad under this traditional C2 model.  It places 
the deploying National Guard in Title 10 status, which makes it subordinate to the 
President, the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commander, and severs the chain 
of command relationship with its state governor. 
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Figure 3. Domestic Title 10 Command65  
 
The President has not employed this extreme solution recently for domestic civil 
support.  In fact, there are legal hurdles that could make it difficult if not impossible to 
use following a catastrophic event.  Title 10 U.S.C. 12304(b) specifies the federal 
government cannot call up the National Guard in Title 10 status to assist “in time of a 
serious natural or manmade disaster, accident or catastrophe.”  The President could 
circumvent this prohibition by invoking the Insurrection Act, but there are significant 
legal and political ramifications should he choose to do so. 
a. Advantages 
This C2 architecture creates unity of command by placing all military 
under one commander subordinate to the Secretary of Defense and President.  The 
President could use it to standardize military civil support response procedures across 
state lines for regional conformity.  It provides the tightest control for the President 
through DoD.  By taking this strong action, it unambiguously puts the President in charge 
and telegraphs the seriousness of the situation to the American people. 
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b. Disadvantages 
Unless the governor requests this action, the President is essentially 
relieving the sovereign state’s commander in chief.  The governor could consider it a 
federal invasion of his sovereign state.  This action removes the state military assets from 
the governor, eliminating his capability to conduct or participate in military operations.  
Without political concurrence and support at the national and state levels, there would 
likely be considerable political consequences and perhaps legal challenges.  Once the 
National Guard is in Title 10 status, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) could significantly 
reduce its utility for use in law enforcement.  Simply invoking a law whose name is the 
Insurrection Act suggests a government in crisis, whether accurate or not.  This could 
shake the confidence of the American public.  In addition, it might embolden enemies to 
take hostile actions while the government, by its own declaration, is unstable. 
c. Considerations   
This model could be applicable when a catastrophe destroys or 
incapacitates the state or territory’s leadership.  If social order does not exist and the state 
governments cannot restore it, the federal government may have to step in.66  If the 
President invokes the Insurrection Act, the PCA limitations can be overcome. 
The President should consider it when uniformity of military response is 
required over a multi-state region.  For example, if there were a multi-state catastrophe 
such as the New Madrid earthquake or pandemic influenza scenarios that required a 
standard military response across the states, this construct could ensure it. 
2. Option 2.  Establish a Dual Status Commander 
With the authorization of the President and consent of the governor, Title 32 
U.S.C. 325 allows a National Guard unit commanding officer to be in federal service 
without giving up his state National Guard status.  This has the potential to create a single 
commander who can command Title 10 forces for the President, and Title 32 and state 
active duty National Guardsmen for the governor.  Only the commander is in this dual 
status; the military forces are not.  This means PCA restrictions still apply to the Title 10 
forces, but not the state active duty and Title 32 forces.  DoD has employed this dual 
                                                 
66 Major General Terry Scherling, (Director of the Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau), interview with 
the author, Washington, DC, June 23, 2006. 
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status C2 arrangement four times, i.e., the Republican and Democratic National Party 
Conventions, the G8 Summit meeting, and Operation Winter Freeze. 
President Bush proposed a parallel to this C2 construct to Governor Blanco during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina.  Title 32 U.S.C. 315 authorizes the President to permit 
a Regular Army (active duty) officer detailed to the National Guard to accept a 
commission in the National Guard without vacating his regular appointment.  Shortly 
after Katrina struck, the administration proposed having Lieutenant General Honore, a 
Regular Army officer, receive a commission from Governor Blanco as a Louisiana 
National Guardsman.  If adopted, Lieutenant General Honore could have commanded the 
Title 10 forces as an active duty officer and commanded the Title 32 forces as a 
Louisiana National Guardsman.  Governor Blanco was concerned she would not have 









































Figure 4. Dual Status Joint Task Force68                                                  
67  Burns, “McHale:  Hurricane Response Could Have Been Better.” 
68  U.S. Northern Command, State Engagement Briefing Command and Control (C2) Models 
(Peterson AFB, CO: 2006), 10. 
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a. Advantages   
This C2 construct puts one military commander over the Title 10 forces 
and over the state active duty and Title 32 forces, resulting in unity of command over the 
military.  If the commander were a Guardsman, he would have familiarity with the 
governor, state staff, agencies, and emergency management procedures.  PCA does not 
restrict state active duty and Title 32 forces from performing law enforcement activities. 
b. Disadvantages   
Having an officer answer to both the President and governor 
simultaneously may be asking too much of a commander engaged in high-intensity 
operations.69  Although his military subordinates know he commands them, the dual 
status commander must obey two commanders-in-chief.  If he receives conflicting 
guidance, not an unlikely scenario given the political nature of disaster response, he does 
not have any effective means to resolve the situation and is in an untenable position.70 
c. Considerations   
Creating this dual status C2 architecture is not necessarily simple or quick.  
Most importantly, both the President and the governor must be willing to adopt the 
model.  There is significant coordination and staff review that must occur within the state, 
National Guard Bureau, combatant command and DoD before the President and governor 
can sign a memorandum of agreement.  All of this takes time to accomplish.  If the 
agreement is not in place before the catastrophe occurs, its coordination may consume too 
much time while civil support operations must be in progress.  In addition, even though 
there is one commander over all of the military, he still requires a staff to help him 
synchronize federal and state military operations.  Either the Title 10 forces or the state 
National Guard will be working with a commander who is unfamiliar to and with them.   
DoD has used this dual status construct in four planned events.  Before the 
civil support operations, there were several months available to conduct planning, select  
qualified commanding officers, vet them, build and train their staffs, rehearse, exercise 
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70  Chris Strohm, "Pentagon Backs Dual Leaders in Domestic Crises," GOVEXEC.Com, February 9, 
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and then execute the plan.  When time is a constraint and the operations will be intense, 
this construct may not be appropriate. 
It is interesting to note the shift in positions regarding the applicability of 
this model to civil support operations following a catastrophic event.  During Hurricane 
Katrina, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, the Honorable Paul 
McHale, recommended this C2 structure to the President.  The Chief, National Guard 
Bureau, Lieutenant General Steven Blum presented it to Governor Blanco on behalf of 
the administration.  Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant General Blum recommended to the 
governor that she not accept it because it did nothing for her.  In his testimony, Assistant 
Secretary McHale noted that in hindsight, he no longer thought it was an appropriate C2 
model.71 
3. Option 3.  Parallel Title 10 and Title 32/State Active Duty Chains of 
Command 
This is the standard C2 model employed during disasters.  The chain of command 
for the Title 10 forces runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense and 
combatant commander to the active duty force commander.  The chain of command for 
the state active duty and Title 32 National Guard runs from the governor through the 
Adjutant General to the state’s task force commander.  To achieve unity of effort, it relies 
on coordinating authority, i.e., authority to require consultation but not compel 
agreement, to synchronize military operations, rather than command authority.72 
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Figure 5. Parallel Command Model73 
 
After Governor Blanco rejected the dual status option, this was the Hurricane 
Katrina C2 architecture for the civil support operations.  Lieutenant General Honore 
commanded the Title 10 forces and Major General Landreneau, Adjutant General, State 
of Louisiana, retained command authority over the Louisiana National Guard.  Major 
General Landreneau testified they achieved unity of effort through extensive use of 
liaison officers, as did Lieutenant General Honore, Lieutenant General Blum, Admiral 
Keating and Assistant Secretary McHale.74 
a. Advantages 
This C2 model is the standard for civil support following major disasters.  
It is the one practiced most often, so would be the one most familiar before a catastrophic 
incident.  Employing it does not require a shift from the standard procedure.  It preserves 
the governor’s control over the National Guard and the President’s control over Title 10 
military.  Commanders have only one commander in chief giving them direction.  The 
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46 
PCA does not restrict the National Guard state active duty and Title 32 forces.  The 
commanders will have their own staffs that they have worked with before.  The construct 
is constitutionally sound and governor endorsed.  
b. Disadvantages 
It does not ensure unity of effort.  The potential to work apart exists and 
there is no single authority to compel cooperation.  It is a weak C2 relationship that relies 
on coordinating authority.  By doctrine, that relationship is better suited to staff planning 
rather than operations.75  There are no standardized joint organizations or procedures that 
facilitate cooperative synchronization between the federal and state forces.  It does not 
provide a simple answer to the question, “who is in charge,” especially when things are 
not going well.  
c. Considerations 
This is the governor preferred C2 option and the one most familiar to the 
states.  It is the standard C2 the National Response Plan contemplates and, therefore, it is 
the one most trained and practiced.  It is politically the least controversial option.  The 
President should have compelling reasons to deviate from this standard model.  
                                                 
75 Joint Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), III-12 – III-13. 
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VIII. STAKEHOLDERS AND INTERESTS 
This chapter identifies the stakeholders who have equity in the issue of the C2 
relationship between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard in civil support operations 
following a catastrophe.  The criteria for inclusion in this group of stakeholders are to 
have deep interests and concerns regarding the issue.  These stakeholders have the power 
to disrupt a cooperative partnership, but not the power to compel participation or to 
ensure it is successful. 
A. THE PRESIDENT   
1. Interests 
The President’s interests include meeting his constitutional obligation to secure 
the nation as the commander in chief and to enforce the laws of the nation.  He has an 
interest in the wellbeing of American citizens by ensuring an effective response following 
catastrophic events.  As an elected official, he is sensitive to political implications of how 
he performs his duties. 
2. Authority   
As commander in chief, the President will decide the C2 structure for the Title 10 
forces.  He can make federal assistance, including Title 10 military forces, available 
following his disaster declaration, at the request of the governor.  He can introduce 
federal forces into a state and federalize the National Guard without the consent of the 
governor by invoking the Insurrection Act.   
B. GOVERNORS   
1. Interests 
As the states and territories’ executives and militia commanders in chief, they 
have an interest in maintaining their sovereignty to include control over their National 
Guard.  They will act to ensure the wellbeing of their citizens.  The governors have an 
interest in bringing federal resources to their state or territory, especially if at no cost to 
the state.  As directly elected public officials, they are sensitive to getting political credit 
and blame, and accountable to their electorate. 
2. Authority 
As the states and territories commanders in chief, they can call forth their 
National Guard.  As leaders of sovereign states, they can refuse Title 10 forces unless the 
48 
President invokes the Insurrection Act.  They can order their National Guard to 
cooperate, or not, with Title 10 military leaders. 
C. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE   
1. Interests 
The Secretary of Defense will focus on his homeland defense missions.  He will 
minimize the involvement of Title 10 forces and the expenditure of DoD resources on 
any missions other than homeland defense.  As the President directs, he will conduct civil 
support operations. 
2. Authority   
He will decide or recommend to the President the Title 10 C2 structure.  He is the 
approval authority for National Guard Title 32 funding.  He can influence the amount of 
resources going to the National Guard.  The Secretary of Defense assigns Title 10 forces 
to USNORTHCOM for civil support operations. 
D. COMMANDER, USNORTHCOM 
1. Interests 
He must maintain command of the Title 10 forces the Secretary of Defense 
assigns to him.  His interest is in ensuring effective response in support of the lead federal 
agency.  He needs to have situational awareness to anticipate missions for Title 10 forces 
and deliver timely response.  He wants to achieve unity of effort for the civil response 
operation. 
2. Authority 
He must comply with lawful orders from the Secretary of Defense.  He may 
coordinate with the National Guard in Title 32 status and he can direct subordinate 
commanders to coordinate with the National Guard.  He has command authority, i.e., 
operational control, over assigned Title 10 forces. 
E. CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU 
1. Interests 
His interest is in ensuring the readiness of the National Guard for its defense 
missions.  To do so, he wants to ensure the National Guard gets the resources, i.e., 
personnel, funding and equipment, to be prepared to respond.  He has an interest in 
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maintaining situational awareness so he can orchestrate National Guard emergency 
management assistant compact support among the states.  
2. Authority 
Because he is the chief of a bureau, he does not have command authority over the 
National Guard when it is in state active duty or Title 32 status.  He can act as a channel 
of communication from the federal level to the Adjutants General, but has no authority to 
direct the National Guard when it is working for the governors.  He can invite 
cooperation and compliance with his guidance and initiatives by controlling the flow of 






































IX. THE USNORTHCOM PLAN 
A. U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND CONCEPT PLAN 2501-05, DEFENSE 
SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 02, Change 1, March 2005, Regional 
Tasking 9, assigned USNORTHCOM the responsibility to prepare a functional plan for 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities operations.  Later revisions to the DoD planning 
model directed the product to be a concept plan.  Concept plans are operations plans in an 
abbreviated format that require expansion to convert them into an operation plan or 
operation order. 
USNORTHCOM completed its Concept Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (CONPLAN 2501-05, DSCA) and published the final Secretary of Defense 
approved version on April 11, 2006.  USNORTHCOM completed the plan after the 
headquarters participated in the Hurricane Katrina civil support operations.  It applied the 
lessons learned from that catastrophic event civil support operation.  This chapter reviews 
the plan with an eye toward the relationship between USNORTHCOM and the National 
Guard during civil support operations following catastrophic events. 
In general, the plan addresses the Title 10, active duty components of DoD.  The 
friendly forces paragraph lists the other combatant commands, components and 
supporting component commands, the military services, supporting defense agencies and 
the Department of Homeland Security.  It includes the Reserve Components, i.e., the 
Army National Guard of the United States and Air Force National Guard of the United 
States, both Title 10 organizations.  The plan names the National Guard Bureau as the 
activity that will coordinate with the National Guard and the states’ Adjutants General.  
Specifically, the Bureau’s role is assisting USNORTHCOM “in synchronizing and 
integrating federal and non-federal military operations to avoid duplication and achieve 
unity of effort.”76 
The plan states USNORTHCOM provides civil support when directed by the 
President or Secretary of Defense, usually after the local, state and or the federal 
                                                 
76  U.S. Northern Command, Concept Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 
(Peterson AFB, CO: April 11, 2006), 8. 
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resources are overwhelmed.  One of the major tasks for USNORTHCOM is to determine 
the appropriate command and control for DoD forces based on the size of the DoD 
response.77  It leaves it to the reader to understand DoD in this context does not include 
the National Guard unless it is in Title 10 status. 
The plan’s key assumptions mention the National Guard.  First, the plan 
recognizes elements of the National Guard will be involved in almost all civil support 
operations.  Second, the plan assumes the National Guard from both the impacted state 
and the National Guard forces deployed to the disaster area under emergency 
management assistance compacts will operate under the control of state authorities, i.e., 
in state active duty or Title 32 status.78 
When the DoD response is significant, the USNORTHCOM commander may 
establish or expand an existing Joint Task Force (JTF) with subordinate JTFs or appoint a 
Joint Force Land Component Commander to provide command and control of the DoD 
forces.  The plan is silent on the command and control relationship with the National 
Guard because they are not part of the DoD response force.  
The execution paragraph 3.c. (13) requests the Chief, National Guard Bureau:  
• Provide daily situation reports on non-federalized National Guard 
activities in the USNORTHCOM joint operations area. 
• Assist USNORTHCOM and subordinate headquarters with integrating and 
synchronizing federal and non-federal military planning, response, 
deployment and redeployment, and transition efforts. 
• Coordinate, assist, and facilitate Joint Force Headquarters–State(s) in 
forming capability packages. 
• Establish liaison with the USNORTHCOM regional task force/task 
force/joint task force to avoid on-site duplication of missions, to ensure 
unity of effort, and share a common operating picture.79 
Paragraph 5, Command and Control, of the basic plan addresses Command and 
Control.  It recognizes there is a Joint Force Headquarters–State in each state and 
territory.  When in Title 10 status, the National Guard forces will operate under the C2 of 
                                                 
77  U.S. Northern Command, Concept Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 12. 
78  Ibid., 10. 
79  Ibid., 25. 
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the USNORTHCOM commander.  The plan correctly describes both alternatives of the 
dual status Title 32 and Title 10 commander as discussed in Chapter VII of this paper.80 
Annex J, Command Relationships, addresses civil support command 
relationships.  Paragraph 1.b.(2) states the command relationships established in Annex J 
apply to all DoD personnel deployed to a civil support operation.  Again, the plan relies 
on the reader to know this does not apply to the National Guard unless it is in Title 10 
status.  In general, the commander of USNORTHCOM will have operational control of 
the DoD civil support response forces.81 
The Command Relationships Annex outlines three ways USNORTHCOM can 
structure its C2 to interact with other agencies and functions.  The three ways are three 
tiers of response depending on the magnitude of the response:  a Defense Coordinating 
Officer, a JTF commander, and functional commands.  It notes this range does not depict 
every possible relationship the command can have with every potential civil support 
partner, but goes on to say, “A coordinating or C2 relationship can exist without explicit 
illustration in the Annex.”82  None of the schematics depicts the National Guard. 
Paragraph 4 of the annex addresses the support and coordination relationships.  
Without identifying who will perform the task, the annex states “Coordinating 
authorities.  Requirements will be identified during execution planning.”  The most 
significant mention of the National Guard is in Paragraph 4.e., Coordination with the 
non-Federalized National Guard.  “National Guard forces operating in a non-Federalized 
status operate under state control when performing civil support operations.  
USNORTHCOM will coordinate with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) as needed.  
NGB is the channel of communication between USNORTHCOM and the National Guard 
of the states.”83 
Appendix 17 to Annex C addresses Incidents of National Significance.  It uses the 
HSPD-5 criteria as further defined in the National Response Plan to describe Incidents of 
                                                 
80  U.S. Northern Command, Concept Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 29-
30. 
81  Ibid., J-2 – J-3. 
82  Ibid., J-3. 
83  Ibid., J-8. 
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National Significance.  Catastrophic incidents are included in the set of Incidents of 
National Significance.  A catastrophic incident could result in sustained national impacts 
over a prolonged period.  They almost immediately exceed resources normally available 
to the state, local and private sector authorities in the impacted areas.  They significantly 
interrupt governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that they 
could threaten national security.84  
This appendix notes the NRP defines catastrophic incidents as any natural or man-
made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass 
casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, 
environment, economy, national morale or government functions. 
It lists some guiding principles for proactive federal response.  One of the 
principles notes that the command’s notification and full coordination with states will 
occur, but the coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and 
use of critical resources.85   
B. ANALYSIS 
CONPLAN 2501-05 provides a thorough template for the active duty military and 
DoD agencies in civil support operations.  USNORTHCOM’s supporting and subordinate 
commands have the guidance they need to plan for civil support.  However, the plan does 
not adequately address the relationship with the National Guard or describe how to 
coordinate operations with the National Guard. 
In general, the USNORTHCOM planners treat the National Guard as state assets.  
As such, they barely acknowledge that the National Guard will be friendly military forces 
operating in the joint operations area.  For standard disaster relief civil support 
operations, this approach may be adequate because the DoD response will be small.  For 
catastrophic events, more specific planning guidance is required. 
If the Hurricane Katrina response is at all indicative of future civil support 
operations following catastrophic events, the number of National Guard troops in the 
joint operations area may be several times larger than the number of active duty soldiers.  
                                                 
84  U.S. Northern Command, Concept Plan 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), C-
17-2. 
85  Ibid., C-17-3. 
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There will have to be some sort of effective coordinating relationship between the 
National Guard and the active duty forces.  The challenge is that the highly variable 
catastrophic event conditions make it difficult to forecast the appropriate C2.  Since the 
specific C2 solution cannot be prescripted, an outline of potential considerations and 
applicable triggers for each option would be helpful. 
The USNORTHCOM planners noted the National Guard probably will be 
operating under state control and USNORTHCOM will coordinate with the NGB.  
Because of the sovereignty of the states and USNORTHCOM’s status as the 
commanding headquarters for federal DoD forces only, this is about as far as the 
command can formally outline the coordination scheme.  However, this approach will not 
be sufficient for large-scale civil support operations.  While USNORTHCOM will 
depend on NGB for situational awareness, especially with respect to deploying National 
Guard forces under emergency management assistance compact, NGB currently does not 
have the resources, capability or fidelity of information to be the operational coordinating 
headquarters for joint operations within the states.  Furthermore, because they are a 
bureau and not a command, they do not have the authority to order, direct, speak for or 
act on behalf of the National Guard who is in state active duty or Title 32 status. 
The plan suggests the solution to this problem.  USNORTHCOM will coordinate 
with NGB.  The NGB will facilitate establishing the state National Guard and Title 10 
forces operational coordinating mechanism in the state.  Assuming the state National 
Guard agrees and cooperates, the concept has merit.  The Title 10 force commander and 
the state National Guard force commander will synchronize and deconflict missions in 
the state to achieve unity of effort.  There is some risk of uncoordinated liaison initiatives 
overlapping and resulting in conflict.  The Title 10 JTF commander will be working in 
the state to establish the liaison mechanisms at the same time NGB is trying to set them 
up.  Assigning one lead activity to coordinate the efforts or executing a plan that 
establishes sectors of responsibility for establishing liaison would reduce redundant 
initiatives and ensure everybody ends up with and understands the ultimate solution. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USNORTHCOM C2 CONSIDERATIONS 
The President will decide the C2 architecture for the Title 10 forces he directs to 
engage in civil support operations following a national catastrophe.  The 
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USNORTHCOM commander may have the opportunity to provide recommendations on 
the C2 structure through the Secretary of Defense.  A suggested list of considerations 
follows.  The USNORTHCOM planners should write them into a tab to the Incidents of 
National Significance, Appendix 17 of Annex C.  This will ensure the staff is aware of 
them and they are in the plan for future reference.  The staff can collect the information 
the commander needs to assess the situation and form his recommendation. 
The character of the catastrophe’s nature and its impacts will shape the 
requirements for the C2 architecture.  The commander should consider the following as 
he develops his recommendation. 
• Politics.  Civil support operations are inherently political.  As the chief 
executive and commander in chief of his National Guard, the governor 
will almost certainly determine the duty status of the National Guard.  The 
President will need compelling reasons to override the governor with 
respect to his National Guard. 
• Effectiveness of response.  If the states are capably handling their civil 
support mission, the commander should not be seeking to take them over.  
Instead, he should be looking for opportunities to reinforce and augment 
where there are capability shortfalls.  Even if the state response is failing, 
the commander should assess whether additional command and control 
would positively influence the performance.   
• Nature of the response and trend for the future.  If there is a likelihood of 
lethal operations, the commander should recommend more positive C2.  
The scope, intensity and complexity of the operations may influence the 
C2.  Certainly, they will influence the rank of the commander of the Title 
10 forces. 
• Requirement for regional uniformity of response.  There may be civil 
support operations that span several states.  If uniformity of the military 
civil support is important, it may require placing all of the forces in Title 
10 status.  There are significant legal challenges to overcome to make this 
a feasible course of action. 
• Size and composition of the response force.  It is unlikely the minority 
participant would C2 an operation absent other compelling factors.  
• Planning time available.  If it is a slowly developing catastrophe with 
planning time before it reaches its peak, the dual status C2 could be viable.  
If it is a no-notice, come-as-you-are operation, the dual status C2 probably 
would take too long to affect. 
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• Duration of the support.  The Title 10 forces need to return to their defense 
mission as soon as the rest of the response community can assume the 
civil support mission.  This includes the Title 10 role and participation in 
the C2 paradigm.  
• Public expectation.  The public needs to be able to understand and accept 
the C2.  If it does not, the political aspect of the civil support operation can 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
59 
X. CONCLUSION AND THE WAY AHEAD 
A. CONCLUSION 
There is no single best USNORTHCOM and National Guard C2 architecture for 
all civil support operations following a catastrophic event.  Events and circumstances will 
influence the President’s decision on which to select as the best alternative.  However, 
planners should not wait until the catastrophe occurs to begin considering which C2 
architecture to select.  One of the purposes of planning is to establish expectations and 
frameworks in advance of execution.  Because the decision on how to achieve unity of 
result is so politically charged, it makes sense to establish and share the decision criteria 
in advance so the issues are understood by all stakeholders and there are no unexpected 
actions.  Even though the C2 may vary, planners can reduce the zone of uncertainty by 
establishing the process to determine C2 architecture. 
The baseline C2 structure should be the parallel Title 10 and Title 32 chains of 
command.  This is the least contentious with the governors and almost all the strategy, 
policy and doctrine suggest this model.  Its legal foundation is the Constitution.  The 
parallel chain of command is the standard for major disaster civil support, so it is the 
scheme most familiar, trained to and practiced.  It should be the default model.  However, 
its success depends on cooperation to affect unity of effort.  Remember, this is the model 
employed after Hurricane Katrina and that civil support operation demonstrated 
improvement is necessary.  It is critical that the stakeholders establish, resource and 
exercise the coordinating procedures and organization so they are effective.   
The situation and circumstances may require deviations from the base C2 model.  
Certainly, if the state governor requests the federal government to take over the National 
Guard, the President needs to be prepared to do so effectively.  When the catastrophe 
destroys the states’ leadership or they have lost control, it may be necessary for the 
President to have Congress declare an emergency and federalize the National Guard to 
place all the military under a Title 10 commander.  He may achieve unity of effort 
through unity of command over the military.  The President could invoke the Insurrection 
Act unilaterally, but that action carries some undesirable implications.   
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For catastrophes that develop slowly and evolve, or if there is adequate planning 
time before the catastrophe to have suitable agreements in place in advance of the event, 
political leaders should consider the Title 10 and Title 32 dual status commander C2 
option.  Both the President and the governor have to agree to the dual status model.  They 
need enough time to select a qualified commanding officer and ensure he is mutually 
acceptable.  The leaders need to either concur in advance with a memorandum of 
agreement appointing the commander or expeditiously staff, approve and sign one.  It 
will require an exceptional commander to take conflicting guidance from two 
commanders in chief and resolve it. 
Although the best C2 model will depend on the situation and conditions, this does 
not mean planners should wait for the next catastrophe and try to establish the C2 on the 
fly.  As Hurricane Katrina civil support operations demonstrated, even when all 
stakeholders involved desperately want to deliver effective civil support it is extremely 
difficult.  By its very nature, catastrophic civil support is politically-charged, complex, 
hard work.  The challenges are significant and the consequences are severe.  Lives 
depend on timely support.  The requirement to perform is intense, and the nation is 
watching and evaluating the performance.  Planners must address everything possible to 
mitigate those conditions.  This includes the C2 considerations. 
B. THE WAY AHEAD  
The statutory and policy environment creates a fabric of overlapping, conflicting 
and ambiguous directives.  However, even without clear authoritative direction to work 
together, the President, Congress and the American public have an expectation that the 
National Guard and Title 10 military will integrate their civil support efforts.   
The way ahead is to form partnerships among the stakeholders, i.e., the governors, 
Chief, National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM, the Adjutants General and the state and 
territories’ National Guard senior officers.  Because there is no central official or 
commander who can provide the missing directive authority to compel cooperation, the 
partnership will have to serve the interests of the members to be effective and to keep the 
stakeholders at the table.  The USNORTHCOM commander needs to convince the 
governors that he does not want to take over their National Guard or to take control of 
civil support operations.  They need to understand he is sincere in wanting to respond to 
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their requests and to be there when they need Title 10 military assistance.  During 
interviews, ADM Keating convinced the author that he is sincere in this regard and he is 
moving out in this direction.  He stressed that C2 for civil support does not mean 
command and control.  Instead, his objective is communication and coordination for 
unity of effort or unity of result.86   
After the commander gets the governors on board, he will need to have a general 
officer continue the effort at the Adjutant General and state National Guard senior officer 
level.  The commander should seek assignment of a full-time National Guard brigadier 
general to the USNORTHCOM staff to undertake this important mission.  As a one-star 
National Guard general officer, he will be senior enough to command the attention of the 
state National Guard and have the credibility of being one of their own.  As a brigadier 
general in the USNORTHCOM headquarters, he would not be so senior as to threaten the 
active duty flag officers, but senior enough to gain access to the commander.  Rather than 
place him in the command section, he should be in the USNORTHCOM J-3 Operations 
directorate as the civil support Division Chief.  
The objective for the partnership is to develop a fully resourced standardized 
synchronization paradigm with supporting organizations that will facilitate unity of effort 
between the Title 10 forces and the National Guard.  The Joint Force Headquarters–State 
may be the answer, but DoD must resource it and then test it.  As an inducement for the 
states’ National Guard to participate, USNORTHCOM should become the combatant 
command advocate and proponent for the resourcing, i.e., funding, personnel and 
equipment, of the organization, especially if it will be in the National Guard.  The 
requirement to synchronize operations cannot remain an unresourced requirement that 
falls too low in the Services’ priorities for them to resource.  After resourcing the 
concept, it becomes a matter of exercising, rehearsing, evaluating and improving it.  This 
is a natural growth of the USNORTHCOM civil support mission as the command 
matures.   
A critical element is to develop a common understanding of the criteria that will 
determine which command and control architecture the President will employ.  The idea 
                                                 
86  Keating, interview, Peterson AFB, CO, June 19, 2006. 
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is to establish in plans what the expectations are so that surprises are few.  As a principle 
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